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THE TRIBAL LABOR SOVEREIGNTY ACT: DO INDIAN 
TRIBES FINALLY HOLD A TRUMP CARD? 
Vicki J. Limas
*
 
I. Introduction 
In each congressional term since 2007, Republican lawmakers, with 
some Democratic supporters, have introduced bills titled “Tribal Labor 
Sovereignty Act.”1 The proposed legislation would amend the National 
Labor Relations Act
2
 (“NLRA”) to explicitly exclude from coverage 
federally recognized Indian tribes
3
 that operate tribally owned enterprises 
on tribal lands.
4
 During the previous two administrations, however, a bill 
reached a vote only once.
5
 The latest identical bills, Senate Bill 63
6
 and 
House Bill 986,
7
 were introduced January 9 and February 9, 2017, 
respectively, with bipartisan sponsors in the House and Republican 
sponsors in the Senate.  
 The failure of previous bills has been attributed to the organized labor 
lobby,
8
 and it can be inferred that the bills failed to advance because 
Democratic lawmakers perceived anti-union or anti-worker motivation, the 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor of Law, Co-director of the Native American Law Center, and Associate 
Dean for Academic Affairs, The University of Tulsa College of Law. 
 1. H.R. 3413, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1395, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2335, 112th 
Cong. (2011); S. 1477, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 511, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 248, 114th 
Cong. (2015); H.R. 986, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 63, 115th Cong. (2017).  
 2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012). 
 3. Although the term “Indian nation” is more generically descriptive of the 
governmental status of the indigenous political groups within the United States, the term 
“Indian tribe,” in its expansive sense to include groups designated as “tribes,” “bands,” 
“nations,” “pueblos,” “communities,” etc., will be used in this article because the various 
federal statutes and the proposed legislation being discussed use the term “Indian tribe” and 
define it to include such designations.  
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 21-22. 
 5. In the 114th Congress, the House approved House Bill 511 by a vote of 249 to 177. 
161 CONG. REC. H8272 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2015). 
 6. S. 63, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 7. H.R. 986, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 8. See Alex T. Skibine, Practical Reasoning and the Application of General Federal 
Regulatory Laws to Indian Nations, 22 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 123, 161 
(2016). 
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latter being the position of organized labor.
9
 In 2015, President Obama was 
reported to have opposed the legislation unless it mandated that tribal law 
provide the same protections as the NLRA.
10
 In reality, the purpose of the 
bills was to preserve the sovereignty of Indian tribes, as governments, to 
adopt labor laws that are appropriate to the needs of their particular 
governments, which Congress recognized in 1935 when it excluded other 
governmental entities from coverage of the NLRA.  
Support for the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act has grown in each 
congressional term, with an increasing showing of bipartisan support from 
Democrats whose states have tribal presence.
11
 The Tribal Labor 
Sovereignty Act may finally pass in the new administration of President 
Trump. Although the 115th Congress’s plate is full this year as the new 
administration deals with the investigation of Russia’s influence on the 
2016 election, national security, tax reform, immigration, and health care, 
the pieces are in place for passage of the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act this 
term. The pieces include Republican, pro-business majorities in each house; 
a president who, as a businessman, has experience with issues tribes face in 
running their businesses and whose platform emphasized local, as opposed 
to federal, regulation; and a Secretary of the Interior who, as a 
congressman, sponsored the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act and supports 
tribes’ sovereign right of self-determination.  
II. The Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act  
The NLRA, enacted in 1935, governs the relationship between 
employees and non-governmental employers that operate enterprises 
affecting commerce. It protects employees’ rights to organize, to choose a 
representative for the purpose of collective bargaining with an employer 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See, e.g., Dan Frosch & Melanie Trottman, Native American Casinos Seek Labor 
Law Exemption; House-Passed Bill Has Bipartisan Support, but Unions Oppose Loss of 
Workers’ Collective-Bargaining Rights, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.wsj. 
com/articles/native-american-casinos-seek-labor-law-exemption-1448650225 (available by 
subscription); Testimony of Jack Gribbon, California Political Director, UNITEHERE! 
International Union, AFL-CIO: Legislative Hearing on H.R. 986, the Tribal Labor 
Sovereignty Act of 2017 (Mar. 29, 2017), https://edworkforce.house.gov /uploadedfiles/ 
gribbon_-_testimony.pdf. 
 10. Frosch & Trottman, supra note 9. 
 11. H.R. 2335, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 511, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 986, 115th 
Cong. (2017). In the 112th Congress, one Democrat, Dan Boren of Oklahoma, supported 
House Bill 2335. In the 114th Congress, two Democrats, Michelle Lujan Grisham of New 
Mexico and Collin Clark Peterson of Minnesota, supported House Bill 511. House Bill 986 
is supported by Ms. Grisham and Mr. Peterson and Gwen Moore of Wisconsin. 
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over terms and conditions of employment, and “to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection.”12 It also prohibits certain employer and union conduct, 
known as “unfair labor practices.”13 The NLRA established the National 
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), which has rulemaking, investigatory, 
and adjudicatory authority, with enforcement through the federal courts.
14
 
The NLRA explicitly does not apply to governmental employers. Its 
definition of “employer” excludes “the United States or any wholly owned 
Government corporation, Federal Reserve Banks, or any State or political 
subdivision thereof.”15 
Not surprisingly, Congress made no mention of Indian tribes in the 
NLRA. It passed the Wheeler-Howard Act, commonly called the Indian 
Reorganization Act (“IRA”),16 one year earlier in 1934. One of the 
provisions of the IRA allows Indians to organize constitutional forms of 
government.
17
 A scholar explained the common sense reason that Indian 
tribes were not mentioned in the NLRA: 
[T]he motive force for the IRA, namely that tribes could 
administer their own affairs with less interference from 
Washington, D.C. . . . was a novel concept to those non-Indians 
concerned with the administration of Indian affairs at the time. 
Certainly, it did not envision that tribes would one day become 
employers . . . . Indian tribes were not left out of the NLRA 
inadvertently; . . . Congress at that time could not imagine that 
tribes would take part in the national economy in the way they 
have, or even have the capability to do so.
18
 
Indian tribes now run governments, and many operate large-scale 
enterprises to fund their governments. They employ many workers and 
make laws governing their relationship with those workers. The sponsors of 
the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act recognize that Indian tribes are sovereign 
governmental entities, just like the entities that the NLRA excludes. The 
                                                                                                                 
 12. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 13. Id. § 158. 
 14. Id. §§ 153-156, 160-161. 
 15. Id. § 152(2). 
 16. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5129 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-51). 
 17. Id. § 5123. 
 18. Brian P. McClatchey, Tribally-owned Businesses Are Not “Employers”: Economic 
Effects, Tribal Sovereignty, and NLRB v. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians, 43 IDAHO L. 
REV. 127, 149 (2006). 
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purpose of the proposed legislation, as stated in the Report accompanying 
S. 63, is to “amend and clarify the National Labor Relations Act . . . so that 
federally-recognized Indian tribes, tribal governments, and tribally-owned 
and operated institutions and enterprises that are located on its [sic] Indian 
lands would be provided equity and parity under the law with respect to 
other governmental employers.”19  
Specifically, the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act amends the exclusionary 
language in section 152(2) of the NLRA’s definition of “employer,” quoted 
above, by adding “‘or any Indian tribe, or any enterprise or institution 
owned and operated by an Indian tribe and located on Indian lands,’ after 
‘subdivision thereof.’”20 It further adds at the end of section 152(2) three 
subsections with definitions of “Indian tribe,” “Indian,” and “Indian lands.” 
“Indian tribe” is defined in the proposed legislation as “any Indian tribe, 
band, nation, pueblo, or other organized group or community which is 
recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the 
United States to Indian because of their status as Indians.” “Indian” is 
defined as “any individual who is a member of an Indian tribe.” While 
“Indian lands” is defined as  
all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; any lands 
title to which is either held in trust by the United States for the 
benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian 
tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States 
against alienation; and any lands in the State of Oklahoma that 
are within the boundaries of a former reservation (as defined by 
the Secretary of the Interior) of a federally recognized tribe.
21
  
Thus, tribes and the enterprises they own and operate on tribal 
reservations, trusts, or restricted lands would explicitly not be subject to 
federal regulation under the NLRA; rather, they would be subject to 
regulation by the tribes themselves.  
III. Congressional Reaction to Decisions Applying 
the NLRA to Indian Tribes 
The first bill proposing the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act
22
 corresponds 
to the 2007 D.C. Circuit decision, San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. 
                                                                                                                 
 19. S. REP. NO. 115-3, at 1 (2017) (emphasis added). 
 20. S. 63, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 986, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 21. S. 63, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 986, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 22. H.R. 3413, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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NLRB,
23
 which upheld the NLRB’s application of the NLRA to a casino 
owned and operated by the San Manuel Band of Serrano Mission Indians 
on its land in California. The NLRB’s 2004 decision24 to interpret the 
NLRA as applicable to Indian tribes represented a significant departure 
from its previous longstanding position that, although Indian tribes were not 
explicitly exempted from coverage by the NLRA, they were implicitly 
exempt because they are governmental entities.
25
  
In the wake of San Manuel, the NLRB has asserted jurisdiction over 
union elections at tribal casinos and unfair labor practice charges against 
tribes operating casinos.
26
 Two cases were appealed to the Sixth Circuit, 
NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Government
27
 and 
Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB,
28
 which held—using different 
rationales from each other and from San Manuel—that the NLRA covered 
Indian tribes. The Soaring Eagle panel disagreed with the Little River Band 
panel’s rationale and would actually have found the NLRA not to apply to 
the tribe, but it was bound by Little River Band’s precedent.29 Although the 
courts’ rationales differed, they emphasized common facts: that the 
majority of employees and customers of the tribal casinos were not 
members of the tribes.
30
 All three decisions downplayed the governmental 
status of tribes and the effect that application of the NLRA would have 
upon the tribes’ ability to pass laws or otherwise regulate their labor 
relations. These decisions rested on faulty legal grounds and deviated from 
                                                                                                                 
 23. 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007). A case in the Ninth Circuit held that the NLRA 
applied to Indian tribes, in the context of enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum issued by 
the NLRB against the tribe; the issue of whether the NLRB had jurisdiction over a tribal 
organization was not decided at the administrative level. NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health 
Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2003).  
 24. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055 (2004). 
 25. See Fort Apache Timber Co, 226 N.L.R.B. 503 (1976); Southern Indian Health 
Council, Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 436 (1988). Contra Sac & Fox Indus., 307 N.L.R.B. 241 (1992) 
(The Board applied the NLRA to a tribally owned factory operating off tribal land). 
 26. See, e.g., Foxwoods Resort Casino, 352 N.L.R.B. 771 (2008); Lytton Rancheria of 
Cal., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (2014); Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 361 
N.L.R.B. No. 45 (2014); Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (2014); 
Casino Pauma, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 60 (2015).  
 27. 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2508 (2016). 
 28. 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2509 (2016). 
 29. Id. at 669. 
 30. San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 
2007); Little River Band, 788 F.3d at 540; Soaring Eagle, 791 F.3d at 652.  
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established federal Indian law jurisprudence, for which they have been 
widely criticized.
31
  
The clash between the application of the NLRA to Indian tribes and the 
tribes’ sovereign authority to make laws to regulate their workplaces is 
illustrated by the Tenth Circuit’s decision in NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan,32 
which held that the NLRA did not pre-empt a tribal right-to-work law. 
Although it did not directly address the issue of whether the NLRA applies 
to tribes, its rationale precludes a conclusion that tribes are covered 
employers under the NLRA. The NLRA recognizes the authority of a “State 
or Territory” to enact laws that prohibit compulsory membership in a labor 
organization.
33
 The Tenth Circuit found the Pueblo to be a sovereign 
“policy-making unit” analogous to a state or territory.34 Such status is 
incompatible with the status of being an employer covered by the NLRA.
35
 
Finally, application of the NLRA to a particular tribe may be barred by 
the tribe’s rights under a treaty with the United States. Although the Sixth 
Circuit held in Soaring Eagle Casino that the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe’s 
1864 Treaty with the United States would not be abrogated by application 
of the NLRA,
36
 at the same time, the NLRB declined to assert jurisdiction 
over the Chickasaw Nation’s Winstar Casino because it determined that 
application of the NLRA would abrogate the Nation’s rights under two 
treaties.
37
  
The sponsors of the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act cite these discordant 
rulings as grounds for the proposed legislation: “[G]iven the split 
                                                                                                                 
 31. It is beyond the scope of this article to explain and critique the rationale of these 
cases. Professor Alex Skibine has done so recently in a comprehensive discussion. Skibine, 
supra note 8, at 130-55. For criticism of the San Manuel cases, see, for example, Brian H. 
Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law, Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of Construction, 86 
OR. L. REV. 413 (2007); Vicki J. Limas, The Tuscarorganization of the Tribal Workforce, 
2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 467; McClatchey, supra note 18. For discussions of the applicability 
of the NLRA and other federal labor and employment statutes to Indian nations generally, 
see, for example, Kaighn Smith Jr., Tribal Self-Determination and Judicial Restraint: The 
Problem of Labor and Employment Relations Within the Reservation, 2008 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 505; Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L. REV. 
691 (2004). 
 32. 276 F.3d 1186, 1198 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 33. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2012). 
 34. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1200. 
 35. See Limas, supra note 31, at 481. 
 36. Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 661 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2509 (2016). 
 37. Chickasaw Nation D/B/A Winstar World Casino, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at 5 
(2015). 
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interpretations from the Circuit courts and the Board, legislation is needed 
to ensure clarity and parity in the application of the NLRA to Indian tribes, 
tribal governments, and tribally-owned and operated institutions and 
enterprises that are located on its [sic] Indian lands.”38 
IV. Indian Tribes Are Not Like Private-Sector Employers  
It is no coincidence that the NLRB’s reversal of position and the 
resulting litigation target tribal casinos. Gross revenues from Indian gaming 
have grown from $24.9 billion in 2006 to $29.9 billion in 2015.
39
 They 
employ hundreds of thousands of workers,
40
 many of whom are not Indian 
or not members of the tribe that employs them. Union representation of 
workers is declining continuously.
41
 Commentators have noted that tribal 
casino workers may be viewed as “easy targets” by organized labor 
“turn[ing] to the service sector to shore up its dwindling base”42 and 
desirous of “rais[ing] money by assessing mandatory dues.”43  
Organized labor views tribal casinos the same way it does casinos owned 
and operated by the private sector, whose employees are largely 
organized.
44
 But, unlike casinos that are operated by private entities for the 
purpose of generating wealth to individuals and corporate shareholders, 
tribal casinos, by law, must be owned and operated by Indian governments 
for the purpose of generating revenue for their governmental infrastructures 
and for services to their citizens. Indian tribes’ gaming operations are 
governed by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
45
 (“IGRA”), which requires 
that “the Indian tribe will have the sole proprietary interest and 
                                                                                                                 
 38. S. REP. NO. 115-3, at 3 (2017). 
 39. Graph: Gross Gaming Revenue Trending, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, 
https://www.nigc.gov/images/uploads/reports/2015_Gross_Gaming_Revenue_Trending.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2017). 
 40. McClatchey, supra note 18, at 132 (citation omitted).  
 41. Union Members—2016, U.S. DEP’T LABOR (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/ 
news.release/union2.nr0.htm (reporting the number of unionized workers across the country 
has declined by 3.1 million since 1989; the percentage of the American workforce that was 
unionized in 2016 was 10.7, compared to 20.1 in 1989). 
 42. See McClatchey, supra note 18, at 133, 132. 
 43. Robert Odawi Porter, Unions See Indian Casinos and Think: Jackpot, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/unions-see-indian-casinos-and-think-jackpot-
1449445336 (available by subscription). 
 44. See, e.g., Gaming: 100,000 Workers Strong, UNITEHERE!, http://unitehere.org/ 
industry/gaming (last visited Sept. 23, 2017) (stating that UNITEHERE! represents 100,000 
gaming industry employees across the country). 
 45. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2012). 
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responsibility for the conduct of any gaming activity.”46 The IGRA further 
provides that net revenue from such operations be used only “to fund tribal 
government operations or programs;” “to provide for the general welfare of 
the Indian tribe and its members;” “to promote tribal economic 
development;” “to donate to charitable organizations;” or “to help fund 
operations of local government agencies.”47 Congress’s purpose in enacting 
the IGRA was “to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by 
Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-
sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”48 
Indian tribes cannot raise revenue through taxation of their citizens, as 
can federal, state, and local governments.
49
 Congress recognized this fact in 
enacting the IGRA and other legislation such as the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act
50
 (“ISDEAA”), which “gives 
tribes the right to assume the responsibility, and associated funding, to carry 
out programs, functions, services and activities . . . that the United States 
government would otherwise be obliged to provide to Indians and Alaska 
Natives.”51 Since the Nixon administration in the 1970s, federal policy and 
legislation have been geared toward providing opportunities for tribes to 
take control of their own destinies as governments.
52
  
However, federal regulation of Indian tribes’ economic development 
activities, particularly through application of the NLRA, runs counter to the 
federal policy of tribal self-determination and the tribes’ ability to govern. 
Like states, most tribes have enacted laws governing employment relations 
on lands within their jurisdiction and the terms of tribal employment. These 
laws may include preference laws to alleviate unemployment and a lack of 
training on tribal lands; collective bargaining laws that do not allow strikes 
in order that government services will not be disrupted by labor discord; 
right to work laws like that of the San Juan Pueblo discussed above; and 
procedures and remedies tailored to a tribe’s specific situation. The rights 
and responsibilities afforded by these laws will differ from those afforded 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(A). 
 47. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(B). 
 48. Id. § 2702(1). 
 49. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development 
as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759 (2004). 
 50. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 5301-5310, 5321-5332, 5345-5347, 5351-5354, 5361-5368, 5381-
5399 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-51). 
 51. Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of 
Tribal Self-Governance Under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 
39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 4 (2014-2015). 
 52. Id. at 3-5. 
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by the NLRA. Indeed, the disputes between the NLRB and the San Juan 
Pueblo, San Manuel Band and Little River Band cited above involved the 
tribes’ attempts to enforce their own labor laws.53 Robert J. Welch, 
Chairman of the Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians, testified at a recent 
hearing on the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act about his tribe’s experience 
with the inordinate costs and labor disruptions caused when an employee 
petitioned under the NLRA to decertify the union that had been 
representing tribal employees under tribal labor laws, and when a union 
representing tribal employees decided to abandon adherence to the tribe’s 
labor law and filed an unfair labor practice charge under the NLRA.
54
 In 
addition, application of the NLRA could run afoul of more general tribal 
powers such as the right to exclude non-members and impose traditional 
forms of punishment, such as banishment, on tribal members, as Brian 
Cladoosby, President of the National Congress of American Indians, 
testified.
55
 
Sponsors of the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act refer to Congress’s 
recognition in the ISDEAA and other federal legislation that tribes must be 
able to exercise authority in their economic development activities and that 
deference must be given to “tribal personnel, wages, and labor laws in 
carrying out programs.”56 In other words, tribal laws, rather than the NLRA, 
must apply to tribal enterprises on tribal lands.  
V. The Trump Administration and the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act 
The extent to which President Trump understands the sovereign status of 
Indian tribes, their government-to-government relationship with the United 
States, and the role of their business enterprises in generating government 
                                                                                                                 
 53. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002); San Manuel 
Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2007); NLRB v. Little 
River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537, 540-41 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 54. Testimony of Robert J. Welch, Jr., Chairman, Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians: 
Hearing on H.R. 986 – “Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2017” (Mar. 29, 2017), https:// 
edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/welch_-testimony_3.29.pdf; see also Testimony of 
Nathaniel Brown, Navajo Nation Council Member: Hearing on HR 986 – Tribal Labor 
Sovereignty Act of 2017, at 4 (Mar. 29, 2017), https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ 
nathaniel_brown_testimony_on_tlsa_final.pdf (discussing the need for “unions [to] work 
with tribes just like they do with the federal government and states”). 
 55. See Statement of the Honorable Brian Cladoosby, President of the National 
Congress of American Indians and Chair of the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community: 
Hearing on H.R. 986 – Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2017, at 6 (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/cladoosby_-_testimony_3.29.pdf. 
 56. S. REP. NO. 115-3, at 3 (2017). 
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income is not entirely clear. Mr. Trump’s most direct remarks on record 
about tribal sovereignty occurred in 1993, when he testified in a 
congressional hearing on implementation of the IGRA,
57
 which involved 
law enforcement issues in Indian gaming.
58
 At that time, Mr. Trump was 
the largest investor in the Atlantic City casino business,
59
 owning three 
casinos there.
60
 Mr. Trump’s testimony focused on what he perceived to be 
an unfair business advantage posed by tribal casinos. During that testimony, 
he averred that an Indian tribe “is only a sovereign nation in that Indians 
don’t have to pay tax.”61 He also alleged that organized crime was 
“rampant” in Indian casinos62 and tribes were not capable of protecting their 
businesses;
63
 questioned the “Indian blood” of a Connecticut tribe, saying, 
“they don’t look like Indians to me;”64 and suggested that the tribe should 
have to share its gaming revenues with all Indians.
65
 The tone of Mr. 
Trump’s rhetoric, which was criticized by the legislators,66 contrasted with 
the more measured tone of Mr. Trump’s prepared statement, in which he 
stated he was not suggesting organized crime had infiltrated Indian 
casinos.
67
 He also acknowledged in the prepared statement his 
understanding that “federal laws like the Taft-Hartley, like the jurisdiction 
of the National Labor Relations Board do not apply. They also cease to 
exist at the tribal land doorstep.”68 However, he made the latter point 
critically, ostensibly out of concern for workers’ rights.69 Mr. Trump’s 
                                                                                                                 
 57. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2012). 
 58. Implementation of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Oversight Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Native American Affairs of the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 103rd Cong. 
8 (1993) (prepared statement of Hon. Bill Richardson, Chair) [hereinafter Implementation of 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Oversight Hearing]. 
 59. Id. at 163 (statement of Hon. Robert G. Torricelli, Representative in Congress from 
New Jersey). 
 60. Id. at 179 (prepared statement of Donald Trump, President, Trump Organization). 
 61. Id. at 176, 234 (statement of Donald Trump). 
 62. Id. at 175 (statement of Donald Trump). 
 63. Id. at 187 (statement of Donald Trump). 
 64. Id. at 242 (statement of Donald Trump). 
 65. Id. at 250, 251 (statement of Donald Trump). 
 66. Id. at 235, 237-238, 239-240 (statement of Donald Trump). Congressman George 
Miller, Chairman of the Committee on Natural Resources, remarked, “In my 19 years on this 
committee, I don’t know when I have heard more irresponsible testimony than I just heard 
from this panel.” Id. at 239 (statement of George Miller). 
 67. Id. at 182 (prepared statement of Donald Trump, President, Trump Organization). 
 68. Id. at 184 (statement of Donald Trump). 
 69. Id. 
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prepared statement also mentioned his federal lawsuit challenging the 
constitutionality of the IGRA.
70
  
Prior to and following Mr. Trump’s testimony, however, he or his 
business representatives approached various tribes to partner in their casino 
ventures. When confronted in the hearing with affidavit evidence from the 
chairman of the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians that Mr. Trump 
had initiated a meeting with him and other tribal officials to discuss 
partnering in a casino venture, Mr. Trump denied that he had done so, but 
admitted that others in the private gaming industry had reached out to 
tribes.
71
 Newspaper reports document several later attempts: In 1997, Mr. 
Trump reportedly agreed to fund the Paucatuck Indians’ research to obtain 
federal recognition in exchange for “a management fee based on a 
percentage of [their] future casino revenues,”72 but the deal fell through 
when the Paucatucks united with the Eastern Pequots, who had been 
negotiating with other investors.
73
 In 2006, Mr. Trump’s representatives 
proposed unsuccessfully to partner with the Narragansett Indian Tribe.
74
 In 
2000, Mr. Trump did enter into a management agreement on a casino 
owned by the Twenty-Nine Palms Band of Mission Indians in California, 
which opened in 2004, with his contract reportedly securing him 30% of the 
casino’s revenue.75 The tribe bought out his interest in 2004.76 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id. at 185; see also Wayne King, Trump, in a Federal Lawsuit, Seeks to Block 
Indian Casinos, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/04/nyregion/ 
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brief discussion of the history of this lawsuit, in which no decision was issued, see Neil Scott 
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WASH. POST (July 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/donald-trumps-long-
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d06711fd2125_story.html?utm_term=.a8647ec64069. 
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in Casino Battle, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept. 11, 2004), http://articles.courant.com/2004-09-
11/news/0409110069_1_tribe-trump-promised-land-casino-federal-recognition. 
 74. Katherine Gregg & Mark Reynolds, Jockeying Intensifies on Casino Legislation, 
PROVIDENCE J., May 24, 2006, at A1. 
 75. Matt Pearce, Outbid, Outhustled, Outmuscled: Donald Trump Has Tried to Break 
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snap-20161017-snap-story.html. 
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Mr. Trump’s self-serving statements as a casino owner and his 
subsequent business dealings with tribes indicate a “complicated” 
relationship with Indian gaming, as characterized in a recent news story 
about the Wilton Rancheria’s efforts to put land into trust to build a casino 
near Sacramento, California.
77
 A spokesperson from another California 
gaming tribe was quoted in that story as saying,  
“A lot will depend on who will be secretary of the interior and 
who will be chairman of the National Indian Gaming 
Commission. . . . Will there be less regulation and bureaucratic 
inertia, or will he favor doing away with gaming exclusivity and 
even tribal sovereignty as analogous to affirmative action and 
preferences? The fact that (Trump) has a casino background 
means he may be hands-on.” 
Indeed, Mr. Trump’s hearing statements, as well as his lawsuit 
challenging IGRA, might suggest a troubling view that IGRA (and perhaps, 
by extension, other Indian legislation) provides unfair, racially based 
preferences to Indian tribes rather than an understanding of the government-
to-government relationship between tribes and the federal government and 
the latter’s trust responsibility to tribes. However, another news story 
reported that Trump advisors assured Jason Giles, executive director of the 
National Indian Gaming Association, and other tribal officials that Mr. 
Trump’s previous statements “aren’t representative of the current 
administration.”78 
While President Trump has detractors among Indian people, particularly 
those angered by his immediate green light on completion of the Dakota 
Access Pipeline and promise to build a wall on the Mexican border,
79
 others 
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are buoyed by his emphasis on infrastructure rebuilding, energy 
development, and diminished federal regulation.
80
 
 President Trump’s own views on the proposed Tribal Labor Sovereignty 
Act are difficult to predict. His business holdings no longer include 
casinos.
81
 He is familiar with the tension in labor-management relations.
82
 
He favors local regulation. Those factors should work in tribes’ favor. 
On the other hand, President Trump’s Secretary of the Interior, Ryan 
Zinke, who reportedly enjoys fairly wide support in Indian Country,
83
 has 
voiced a commitment to tribal sovereignty and self-determination, and is on 
record for supporting the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act. Prior to his 
appointment, Secretary Zinke was a representative from Montana and a 
sponsor of the proposed legislation.
84
  
A week following his confirmation, Secretary Zinke testified along with 
a number of tribal officials before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs 
oversight hearing on priorities for the Trump administration. Secretary 
Zinke opened his remarks by stating, “Regardless of political party, our 
duty as Americans is to uphold our trust responsibilities and consult and 
collaborate on a meaningful basis on a government-to-government basis 
with Tribes from Maine to Alaska.”85 With regard to tribal economic 
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development and the importance of tribal self-determination, Secretary 
Zinke said, 
[T]he Administration has an opportunity to foster a period of 
economic productivity through improved infrastructure and 
expanded access to an all-of-the-above energy development 
approach. I fully understand that not all nations have access to 
energy resources or choose to develop them and I respect their 
position. As I have mentioned earlier, sovereignty should mean 
something and the decision to develop resources is one that each 
tribe must make for itself.
86
 
During the hearing, tribal officials identified passage of the Tribal Labor 
Sovereignty Act as a priority. Keith Anderson, Vice Chairman of the 
Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, listed among his priorities that 
Mr. Zinke  
take the lead within the Trump Administration to secure early 
enactment of the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2017 . . . [and] 
restore seven decades of legal precedent by treating tribal 
government employers the same as all other sovereign 
governmental employers. This bill is not about labor unions, it is 
about tribal sovereignty, about our tribal right to set our own 
laws for our own employees on our own lands.
87
 
Jefferson Keel, Lieutenant Governor of the Chickasaw Nation, concurred 
with Mr. Anderson’s statement about the proposed legislation and the 
importance of “strengthening the federal law’s provision of parity to tribal 
sovereigns.”88 When Secretary Zinke was asked by Senator Jerry Moran, 
sponsor of the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act in the Senate, to commit to 
seeing that the administration supports and enacts it once it passes through 
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both houses, he replied, “Absolutely, sir. I was glad to sponsor it. I look 
forward to progressing.”89  
Secretary Zinke is solidly on board with making the Tribal Labor 
Sovereignty Act law. Presumably he was appointed by President Trump for 
his expertise in matters affecting Indian Country and consequently 
President Trump will listen to his advice. 
VI. Conclusion 
President Trump has the opportunity to make a significant contribution 
to economic development and self-determination in Indian Country through 
passage of the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act. A mere clarification of a 
definition would afford tribes assurance that their ability to enact and 
enforce their labor relations laws would not be interfered with by the 
federal government or outside parties. After ten years, Republicans control 
both houses and the presidency, and the legislation has Democratic allies as 
well. President Trump’s influence would be key, and he will be wisely 
advised by Secretary Zinke on this issue.  
President Trump’s commitment to building infrastructure should not be 
limited to brick and mortar only. The strengthening of Indian tribes’ 
sovereign ability to make and enforce laws and exercise authority over their 
lands will necessarily strengthen tribal infrastructures and therefore self-
sufficiency. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Streaming Video: Oversight Hearing on “Identifying Indian Affairs Priorities for 
the Trump Administration,” U.S. SENATE COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS (Mar. 8, 2017), at 
1:22:38, https://www.indian.senate.gov/hearing/oversight-hearing-identifying-indian-affairs-
priorities-trump-administration1. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
